Betriebssysteme · Institut für Systemarchitektur · Fakultät Informatik · TU Dresden



27. 01. 2006

PeerReview: Detecting Deviant Behavior in Distributed Systems


Andreas Haeberlen

Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Saarbrücken


Distributed systems have complex failure modes and are prone to a variety of security attacks. In one class of attacks, a node is compromised by an attacker and then deviates from the protocol in order to exploit or disrupt the system, deny services to users, or to censor content.

Byzantine state machine replication can mask faults of this type as long as less than a third of the nodes are faulty at any given time. However, while these algorithms are very powerful, they tend to have significant overhead and do not scale to large groups.

In this talk, I will present a novel, complementary technique that cannot mask Byzantine faults, but can quickly expose them. Once a fault is exposed, the corresponding node can be removed from the system, and its functions can be reassigned to other nodes, which limits the disruption that is caused by the fault.
Julian Stecklina, http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/~jsteckli/
7. May 2012
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