

Department of Computer Science Institute of System Architecture, Operating Systems Group

# PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: THE WEB

MICHAEL ROITZSCH




## THE WEB AS A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM



### WEB HACKING SESSION




#### 3-TIER






#### SCENARIO



- user accesses a sensitive service
- attacker tries to disturb
- various complex layers
- independently developed technologies are being combined
- what you see may not be what you get...



#### BACKEND



- goal: manipulate state stored in the backend DB
- not directly accessible (hopefully)
- improper input checking in frontend server required
- nice: inconsistency is persistent

#### EXAMPLE IN PHP


```
$password = $_POST['password'];
$id = $_POST['id'];
$sql = "UPDATE Accounts SET
PASSWORD = '$password' WHERE
account_id = $id";
```

Now imagine: password=';--

SQL injection



#### BOBBY TABLES



Comic by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com



#### LICENSE PLATE




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Problems in Practice: The Web



#### FRONTEND



- goal: manipulate content delivered to the browser
- infrastructure attacks like
   DNS cache poisoning
- solution for this:
   make sure you use SSL
- ... and check CRLs
- improper input checking can still bite you



#### EXAMPLE

- http://example.com/?query=query string
- generates website containing:
   You are looking for: query string
- so how about that:
  http://example.com/?query=HTML code
- remember that?
  http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/?
  search=</strong></div>...



### TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT STEPPING DOWN





#### CREDENTIALS

- Can you steal site credentials with this?
- imagine a bank website allowing injection
- What do we have?
  - there is the standard bank login on the page
  - you can inject a script into the page
  - you want to keep the login form functional
- How do you get the password?



#### SAME ORIGIN

- JavaScript can access password fields
- you cannot use AJAX to send the password
- same origin policy
  - JavaScript may only connect back to the originating server (with some tolerance)
- can be defeated with <img> tags
  - encode password in URL to ping your server
- JavaScript can also read cookies...





- disallow cross-site image loading?
  - lots of sites use this
- no JavaScript access to password field?
  - AJAX logins need this
- fix web application
  - well...



#### TECHCRUNCH

techcrunch.com undertone.com

googleadservices.com quantserve.com

facebook.com crunchboard.com

snap.com google-analytics.com


wordpress.com scorecardresearch.com

topsy.com ixnp.com

doubleclick.net fbcdn.net



#### REMOTE CONTROL



- goal: trick the browser to not show what's actually happening
- or: how to pull strings behind the user's back
- or: can one website control another one?
- no mischief with the server communication



#### SCENARIO

- user visits a regular website you control
- Can you obtain credentials of a different site?
- some preconditions
  - user is logged in to the target site in another browser tab
  - the target site identifies the user session with a cookie
- no cross-site cookie leakage in browser



#### CSRF

- same origin policy prevents AJAX to target
- again, <img> is your friend
- one website can send arbitrary requests to another, unrelated site
- cross site request forgery
- a special case of the confused deputy problem
- requests are blindly operating the target



#### CAN DO

- send requests and GET parameters
  - click buttons in the UI of the target site
  - operate search fields and other text input
- basic or digest authentication? cookies?
  - browser automatically sends credential
  - session riding
- POST requests?
  - manufacture a <form> instead of <img>



#### TARGETS

- study in late 2008: high-profile bank websites vulnerable
- DSL-Routers
  - disable firewall
  - reset wifi protection
  - enable UPnP
- browser-based port scanning
  - this is behind the corporate firewall





- disable cross-site POST requests
  - GET requests should by definition never change persistent state
  - there is a <u>Firefox plugin</u> for that
- never authenticate a change of persistent state by cookie only
- pass an additional credential
  - session ID in URL, edit tokens



#### OTHERWISE


Log in	
Don't have ar	account? Create an account.
You must have	cookies enabled to log in to OSWiki.
Username:	
Password:	
0	Remember my login on this computer
(	Log in E-mail new password
`	

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#### BLINDNESS



- goal: mislead the user to not seeing what's actually happening
- nothing going on behind your back
- the internal state of the browser is properly displayed
- but you don't notice...



#### PICK ONE

## www.paypal.com

CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A (U+0430)

LATIN SMALL LETTER A (U+0061)

## www.pal.com

#### homograph attack



#### GENERALIZE

FRACTION SLASH (U+2044)

https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd


www.bank.xn--comaccountlogin-uh0iha.ab.cd

https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd

www.bank.com




#### CONTENT






#### BETTER

28







#### **PADLOCKS**





#### CLICKJACKING









- this only works when logged in
  - always log out explicitly
  - do not use persistent logins
- you may want to check wether your password manager autofills inside frames



#### SUMMARY

Is everything lost?

Yes