

Faculty of Computer Science Institute of Systems Architecture, Operating Systems Group

PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: THE WEB

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
THE WEB AS A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM



WEB HACKING SESSION




3-TIER






SCENARIO



- user visits a service
- attacker tries to disturb
- various complex layers
- independently developed technologies are being combined
- what you see may not be what you get...



BACKEND



- goal: manipulate state stored in the database
- not directly accessible (hopefully)
- improper input checking in frontend server required
- nice: inconsistency is persistent




EXAMPLE IN PHP

```
$password = $_POST['password'];
$id = $_POST['id'];
$sql = "UPDATE Accounts SET
    PASSWORD = '$password' WHERE
    account_id = $id";
```

```
Now imagine: password=';--
SQL injection
```



BOBBY TABLES



Comic by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com




LICENSE PLATE





FRONTEND



- goal: manipulate content delivered to the browser
- infrastructure attacks likeDNS cache poisoning
- solution for this:make sure you use SSL
- improper input checking can still bite you



EXAMPLE

- http://example.com/?query=query string
- generates website containing:You are looking for: query string
- so how about that:
 http://example.com/?query=HTML code
- remember that? http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/? search=</div>...

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STEPPING DOWN







- can inject <script> code
- this code will run with the privileges of the embedding site (think IE zones)
- cross-site scripting
- Can you steal site credentials with this?
- imagine a bank website allowing injection
- How do you exfiltrate the password?



SAME ORIGIN

- JavaScript can access password fields
- you cannot use AJAX to send the password
- same origin policy
 - JavaScript may only connect back to the originating server (with some tolerance)
- can be defeated with tags
 - encode password in URL to ping your server
- JavaScript can also read cookies...

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- disallow cross-site image loading?
 - lots of sites use this
- no JavaScript access to password field?
 - AJAX logins need this
- fix web application
 - well...
- never click on suspicious links
- always use SSL

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DOS: Problems in Practice






So you think SSL works?

- You explicitly type https://?
- Your site loads all JavaScript securely?
- Your platform checks for certificate revocation?
- ... and for X.509 Basic Constraints?
- You trust all CAs on this planet to never issue broken certs?



REMOTE CONTROL



- goal: trick the browser to not show what's actually happening
- or: how to pull strings behind the user's back
- or: can one website control another one?
- no mischief with the server communication



SCENARIO

- user visits a regular website you control
- Can you use credentials of a different site?
- some preconditions
 - user is logged in to the target site in another browser tab
 - the target site identifies the user session with a cookie
- no cross-site cookie leakage in browser





- same origin policy denies AJAX to target
- again, is your friend
- one website can send arbitrary requests to another, unrelated site
- cross site request forgery
- a special case of the confused deputy problem
- requests are blindly operating the target



CAN DO

- send requests and GET parameters
 - click buttons in the UI of the target site
 - operate search fields and other text input
- basic or digest authentication? cookies?
 - browser automatically sends credential
 - session riding
- POST requests?
 - manufacture a <form> instead of

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TARGETS

- study in late 2008: high-profile bank websites vulnerable
- browser-based port scanning
 - this is behind the corporate firewall
- WiFi routers with web interface
 - disable firewall
 - reset wifi protection
 - enable UPnP

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- disable cross-site POST requests
 - GET requests should by definition never change persistent state
- never authenticate a change of persistent state by cookie only
- pass an additional credential
 - session ID in URL, edit tokens




OTHERWISE

Log in	
Don't have an account? Create an account. You must have cookies enabled to log in to OSWiki.	
Username:	es enabled to log in to OSVVIKI.
Password:	
Remember my login on this computer	
Log in E-mail new password	



BLINDNESS



- goal: mislead the user to not seeing what's actually happening
- nothing going on behind your back
- the internal state of the browser is properly displayed
- but you don't notice...



PICK ONE

www.paypal.com

CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A (U+0430)

LATIN SMALL LETTER A (U+0061)

www.paypal.com

homograph attack



GENERALIZE

FRACTION SLASH (U+2044)

https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd


www.bank.xn--comaccountloginuh0iha.ab.cd

https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd

www.bank.com



CONTENT







PADLOCKS





CLICKJACKING











- this only works when logged in
 - always log out explicitly
 - do not use persistent logins
- you may want to check wether your password manager autofills inside frames




CONCLUSION

- web standards have gotten complex
- even bug-free behavior is vulnerable
- browsers are a bad application platform
- we did not even talk about WebSockets, WebGL, WebRTC, ...









SUMMARY

Is everything lost?

Yes