Software Sandboxes

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(slides stolen from Björn Döbel)
Outline: Isolation

• Why and what to isolate?

• Machine-Level Isolation
  • Virtual Machines
  • OS-level isolation: chroot, BSD Jails, OS Containers, SELinux

• Application-Level Isolation
  • Chromium Architecture
  • Native Client
The need for isolation

- Large-scale: Multi-user systems
  - Security:
    Prevent other users from reading/modifying my data...
  - Sharing:
    ... but allow this for certain exceptions.
  - Fair distribution of resources (CPU time / network bandwidth) among users

- Small-scale: Integrate software from differing sources
  - Web browser: websites, plugins
What do we isolate for?

- **Fault Isolation**
  - A faulting application shall not take down others.

- **Resource Isolation**
  - Global resources shall be distributed fairly across all users
  - What is fair?

- **Security Isolation**
  - Applications shall not access or modify others' data.
Separate Physical Machines

App 1

App 2

"air gap"

App 3
Separate Physical Machines

- Advantages:
  - Achieves isolation
  - Different OS/software setups

- Disadvantages:
  - Resource overcommit
  - Administration effort
  - Sharing difficult
Virtual Machines

- Idea: better resource utilization by running multiple virtual machines on a single physical
Virtual Machine Monitor

- Provides virtual hardware environment
  - Guest OS runs as on real hardware
  - Intercept (and emulate) privileged instructions
  - Virtual devices

- Type 1 – Bare metal
  - Runs as OS directly on hardware
  - e.g., VMware ESXi, Xen

- Type 2 – hosted
  - Part of a native OS (e.g., kernel module)
  - e.g., KVM, VirtualBox
Virtual Machines for Isolation

• Advantages
  • Isolation
  • Better resource utilization
  • Different OS/SW setups

• Disadvantages
  • Management
  • Slight Performance overhead
  • Sharing still difficult

Many more implementation issues: See lectures on Microkernel-Based Operating Systems and Microkernel Construction
Isolation in a multi-user system

- Unix path name resolution
  - Each process has a lookup root (default: `/`)
  - `open("/foo/bar/baz")` traverses file system hierarchy starting from this root

- (Limited) ACLs to manage access rights
  - Single group/owner not sufficient for complex access policies

- Idea: Restrict users/programs' access to parts of the file system → `chroot`
Chroot: Example

- Process A:
  - Global file system access
  - open("/bin/ls") \(\rightarrow\) returns file descriptor to /bin/ls
- A creates process B:
  
  ```
  pid = fork();
  if (pid == 0) // child
  {
    chroot("/var/Domain1");
    chdir("/var/Domain1");
    setuid(some_user);
    execve("program B");
  }
  ```

  Sandboxing
Chroot: Example

- Process B now has /var/Domain1 set as its lookup root
  - `open("/bin/ls")` returns file descriptor to 
    /var/Domain1/bin/ls

- Ideally, no access to anything outside 
  /var/Domain1 possible for process B

- Sharing between users:
  - Make files/directories visible in different locations (e.g. linking)
Chroot is no security mechanism!

- Chroot is meant to restrict file access of well-behaving applications
  - Intended for software testing

- No restrictions on
  - Loading kernel modules
  - Opening network connections
  - Reading `/dev/kmem`
  - Tracking other processes (e.g., through `ps` / `top`)
Breaking out of chroot

• Step 1: Become root
  • Find an exploit as described in last week's lecture

• Step 2:

```c
fd = open(".", O_RDWR);
mkdir("./tmpdir", 0755);
chroot("./tmpdir");
fchdir(fd);
for (i = 0; i < 1024; ++i)
  chdir("..");
chroot(".");
```
Breaking out of chroot

Starting as process B, chroot'ed to /var/Domain1...

```c
fd = fopen(".", O_RDWR);
→ fd now contains valid file descriptor of /var/Domain1
```
Breaking out of chroot

Starting as process B, chroot'ed to /var/Domain1...

```c
fd = fopen(".", O_RDWR);
→ fd now contains valid file descriptor of /var/Domain1

mkdir("./tmpdir", 0755);
→ creates new directory 'tmpdir' below current one
```
Breaking out of chroot

```
chroot("./tmpdir")
→ sets B's resolution root to /var/Domain1/tmpdir
→ so B can't access anything above, right?

But we still have a file descriptor pointing outside!

fchdir(fd);
→ sets the current working directory to /var/Domain1
→ this is POSIX-certified behavior
```
Breaking out of chroot

- Now `chdir("..")` in a long loop
- At some point we will hit the real root directory
- Now finally
  
  `chroot("./");`
  
  sets B's resolution root to `/`.
- Mission accomplished.
*BSD: Jails

- Based on chroot + kernel modifications

- **Prohibited:**
  - Loading kernel modules
  - Modify network configuration
  - (Un-)mount file systems
  - Create device nodes
  - Access kernel runtime parameters (sysctl)

- **Permitted:**
  - Run programs within jail (working directory...)
  - Signalling processes within a jail
  - Modification of in-jail file system
  - Bind sockets to TCP/UDP ports defined at jail creation
Jails: Implementation

- **Added jail system call**
  - Create jail structure → unmodifiable after setup
  - Attached to every process
    - Only processes within a jail can add processes to it
    - No breaking out of chroot

- **Adapted other system calls**
  - Limit PID/GID/TID-based system calls

- **Had to adjust some drivers**
  - e.g., virtual terminal needs to belong to specific jails
Access Control: Theory

• **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)**
  • Security (isolation) enforced based on object-subject relationship
  • Linux: File System → file ownership

• **Mandatory Access Control (MAC)**
  • Isolation based on object – (subject x operation) relationship
  • e.g., Program A with UID X may read a file;
    Program B with UID X may also write it
  • central policy enforcement, no user control

• **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)**
  • Subjects can have dynamic roles assigned
  • Access based on object-role relationship

• *Principle of Least Privilege*
SELinux

- RBAC for Linux (co-developed by NSA...)
- Type Enforcement
  - Processes are placed in dedicated sandboxes (domains)
  - Fine-grained configuration per domain
    - Which files can be accessed? (And how?)
    - Which network ports can be bound to?
    - Can the app render to an X11 window?
    - Can the app fork() new processes? In which domain?
SELinux: Architecture

Application

System Call Layer

Kernel Services

Linux Kernel

Linux Security Modules

Sandboxing
SELinux: Policies

- Policy files define
  - User roles
    \texttt{user joe -> role user\_t}
  - Object types
    \texttt{dir /etc/selinux -> policy\_src\_t}
  - Permissions
    \texttt{r\_dir\_file(user\_t, policy\_src\_t)}
    \rightarrow user\_t may read policy\_src\_t

- \texttt{checkpolicy} compiler generates loadable kernel module to enforce rules
Linux Security Modules (LSM)

- Loadable Kernel Modules

- `struct security_operations` {
  
  ```
  int (*file_open) (struct file *,
  const struct cred *);
  ```

  `[..]`

  `[..]`

  `};`

- `extern int register_security(
  struct security_operations*)`;
static int do_entry_open(struct file *f, ..., const struct cred *cred)
{
    [...]

    error = security_file_open(f, cred);
    if (error) { ... }

    [...]
}
Container-Based Virtualization

- Jails, SELinux: security isolation + some fault isolation
  - Process cannot modify state outside its jail
  - Fine-grained SELinux policies may also limit fault propagation
    - But configuration is a mess...

- Resource isolation still missing

- Enter: container-based virtual machines
  - Recent gain in popularity:
    - https://linuxcontainers.org
    - http://www.docker.com
Containers: Motivation

• Full virtualization is expensive
  • Implementation overhead
    – Need to have pass-through drivers available
  • Management overhead
    – VM configuration in addition to setup of guest OS
  • Runtime overhead (though small)

• Often we don't need all features
  • Many use cases warrant ”A Linux installation”
Linux VServer

• Jails-like Linux modification
  • Extended chroot
    - Chroot barrier: prevent breaking out
  • PID / resource name spaces + filtering
  • Network isolation
    - only bind apps to predefined set of IP addresses / ports

• Share libraries / kernel across VM instances
VServer: Resource Isolation

- Goal: Fair distribution of resources (e.g. CPU time)
- But what is fair?
  - Fair share → each VM gets the same amount of compute time
  - Proportional Share → VMs with more processes get larger amount of resources
- Linux: Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS)
  - All processes get the same amount of time
  - No notion of process-VM mappings
VServer: Token-Bucket Scheduler

- Each VM has a bucket

- Every timer tick removes a token from VM's bucket

- If bucket is empty: remove all VM's processes from run queue until threshold of tokens has been refilled

- Refill: over time according to some policy

- Allows to implement proportional and fair share
VServer: I/O

• Network: use existing Linux traffic shaping mechanisms
  • Bandwidth reservations
  • Shares $\rightarrow$ specify how non-reserved bandwidth is distributed between VMs

• Disk: rely on Linux disk scheduler to do the right thing
  • Disk is less about isolation, more about optimizing accesses
Application-Level Isolation

• Complex applications → share code from different sources
  • Shared libraries
  • Plugins
  • Interpreted Languages

• Popular example: web browser
  • Flash plugin
  • JavaScript
Web-Browsing, ca. 2008

Browser

DOM Bindings

HTML Renderer

Network

User Interface

JavaScript Engine

Storage (Cookies etc.)

Plugins

Sandboxing
Monolithic Browser: Problems

- Web pages communicate through DOM
  - Unrelated page can inspect and modify data
  - Access Control: Same-Origin Policy
    http://www.example.com
    http://www.example.com/p2
    https://www.example.com
- Web pages may include data from different sources (e.g., iframes)
- User credentials stored by browser
  - May be (mis-)used by other pages
- Per-page isolation infeasible: web apps need multiple pages
  - Calendar window
  - Email compose window
  - ...

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Chromium: Isolating Web Programs

Site Instance

Sandboxing
Chromium: Isolating Web Programs

Browsing Instance

Sandboxing
Web Processes

- No direct storage access
- Single thread of execution
- chroot to empty temp dir

- Might require FS access
- Fault isolation

- Rendering Process
- DOM
- HTML
- JS
- Plugins
- UI
- Network
- Storage

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Chromium & Co.

- Isolate web pages into OS processes

- Difficult:
  - determine exact boundaries...
  - ... while maintaining compatibility

- Gain:
  - Security & Fault Isolation between web pages
  - Performance → parallel rendering possible
  - Accountability

- Enter unlimited possibilities of cloud wonderland...
Browsers & Plugins

You Tube
NETFLIX
WEB.DE
Microsoft Silverlight
activex
Java

Sandboxing
Plugin Problems

• Goals:
  • Native code execution (JIT or interpreted)
  • Access to local resources (disk, ...)

• Problems:
  • Circumvent browsers' security mechanisms
  • Arbitrary code execution possible

• Solutions
  • Ask for user approval before running plugin
  • Language-level security (e.g. Java Class Loader) → often open up new attack surface
  • Process Isolation → protects web pages, can still exploit system call interface

Sandboxing
Native Client

- Allow plugins (NaCl modules) compiled to native x86 code

- **Inner Sandbox**: limit execution to module's code and data

- **Outer Sandbox**: System Call Policy Enforcement (think: SELinux)
Native Client: Application Model

Web Browser
- Image Viewer
- DOM
- HTML
- JS

Plugin API

NaCl Module
- Native Imaging Application

Service Runtime

System Calls

Sandboxing
NaCl Modules

• NaCl module and service runtime in same address space
  • Module code must not break out of its text/data region
  • But we need well-defined ways to
    – Perform system calls (if policy permits)
    – Communicate with web page through plugin API

• Solution: Dedicated compiler (adapted GCC) that enforces rules on NaCl modules
NaCl: Module Rules (1)

- Once loaded, the binary is not writable
  - Enforced using mprotect()
  - Prevents self-modifying code

- Binary is statically linked
  (start address == 0, entry point = 64 kB)
  - No dynamically loaded code → allows static validation during startup
  - Predefined starting point required for load-time validation
  - Address restrictions: later
NaCl: Module Rules (2)

- All indirect control transfers use a nacljmp pseudo-instruction
  - Disable ret / function pointers → harden stack smashing

- The binary is padded up to the nearest page with at least one `hlt` instruction
  - Prevent jump to arbitrary address → will trigger `hlt`
NaCl: Module Rules (3)

- The binary contains no instructions or pseudo-instructions overlapping a 32-byte boundary
  - Alignment restrictions for indirect jumps (coming soon)

- All valid instruction addresses are reachable by disassembly that starts at the base address
  - Need access to all code for analysis

- All direct control transfers target valid instructions
  - Prevent jump into middle of instruction
NaCl: Execution/Data Confinement

- Service Runtime loads NaCl module into address space
NaCl: Execution/Data Confinement

- Service Runtime loads NaCl module into address space
- HW Segmentation restricts code and data accesses
  - Example: EIP = 0xF00BA4 translates to 0xF00BA4 + CS.Base
  - GPF on segment overrun
NaCl: Data Flow Integrity

- Problem: x86 code may jump to arbitrary address (e.g., using `ret` or `jmp *%<register>`)  
- NaCl: Alignment makes sure that every 32-byte aligned address is a valid instruction  
- Use `nalcjmp` instead of indirect control flow:  
  ```c
  and %<reg>, 0xFFFFFFFFFE0
  jmp *%<reg>
  ```  
- Result: code only contains jumps to valid targets  
- Disallowed instructions  
  - x86 segment modifications  
  - `ret`  
  - `syscall / int 0x*`  
- No support for POSIX signals  
  - They use the SS segment themselves  
- Remaining issue: controlled calls into/out of the sandbox
NaCl: Out of the Sandbox

- NaCl code may jump into trampoline (32-byte aligned)
- Each 32-byte aligned word is either
  - An entry to a service routine call
    - mmap / sbrk
    - thread creation
    - Plugin API calls
  - Or a HLT instruction
- Trampoline may contain unsafe code
Native Client: Summary

- Plugins in isolated process
- Compiler enforces
  - Reliable Disassembly
- Sandbox enforces
  - Data Integrity
  - Control Flow Integrity
  - No unsafe instructions

Result: We can play Quake in the browser!
Reading List


- Reis, Gribble "Isolating Web Programs in Modern Browser Architectures", EuroSys 2009
