Microkernel Construction Capabilities

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1/33

Introduction

- Global Names
- ACL
- Capabilities in General
- Capabilities in NOVA

- How do you find/access resources?
- How do you restrict access to resources?

- One global namespace for (one type of) resources
- Example: semaphores, processes, devices, ... on UNIX

Pros & Cons

- + Simple
- Name clashes: people need to agree on names.
- What if a malicious process registers a name first?
- All resources are visible: just try to access them

- Attach a list of permissions (subjects) to each object
- Permission depends on who you are, not what you have

Pros & Cons

- + No need to give permissions explicitly
- + Makes it easy to restrict access to specific objects
- Makes it hard to restrict specific subjects
- POLA is more difficult to achieve
- Requires (global) names
- Confused deputy problem

Confused Deputy Problem

- Compiler service: compile <source> <object>
- Service stores billing information in file "bill"
- Client executes: compile foo bill
- Service has access to bill file, client does not
- Problem: service is acting on behalf of the client, but opens files with *its own* permissions
- One solution: the client opens files and passes file descriptors (capabilities) to service

- Introduction
- Capabilities in General
 - Overview
 - Operations
- Capabilities in NOVA

Capabilities

- Give each subject a local namespace
- Operations to exchange objects between namespaces
- Permission depends on what you have

Pros & Cons

- + Makes it easy to restrict specific subjects
- + Separation of subsystems, composable, independent
- + POLA is easy to achieve
- Need to give permissions explicitly
- Exchanging, especially revoking, capabilities is difficult

Overview



Operations

- Map/delegate:
 - Copy capability from one Cap Space to the other
- Grant:
 - Move capability from one Cap Space to the other
- Revoke:
 - Remove capability, recursively
- Lookup:
 - Search capability by selector and return its permissions
- Translate:
 - Translate selector from one Cap Space to the other

Hierarchical Organization



Outline

- Introduction
- Capabilities in General
- Capabilities in NOVA
 - Capability Spaces
 - Mapping Database
 - Delegate, Translate and Revoke
 - Data Types
 - Receive Windows

Each protection domain (Pd) has

- Space_obj: object capabilities
- Space_mem: memory capabilities (pages)
- Space_pio: I/O port capabilities

Similarities and differences

- Shared: capability delegation, revocation, ...
- Differences:
 - Object caps are created and used via system calls
 - Port and memory caps are referring to existing resources
 - Passed to root task, distributed in the system via delegation
 - Memory capabilities lead to page table entries
 - Port capabilities lead to bits set in the I/O bitmap

Object Capability Space



Memory Capability Space







Mapping Database







Mapping Database – Translate



Mapping Database – Translate









IPC with Delegate



UTCB Layout



Selec	COF	Order	Mask	т
31	12	7	2	0

- Order specifies the number of capabilities (2^{order})
- Selector specifies the first capability
- Selector has to be size aligned, i.e., a multiple of 2^{order}
- wrong: order=2, selector=6, okay: order=2, selector=8
- Mask allows to reduce permissions
- T specifies capability space (objects, memory, I/O)

Typed Words

Delegate:

	Hotspot	Н	G D	1	1
Capability Range Descriptor					
31		12			0

Translate:



Capability Delegation: Order of Events

- Receiver sets up receive window (writes CRD into UTCB)
- Receivers waits for IPC
- Sender puts typed item into UTCB
- Sender calls portal
- Kernel delegates typed item
- Kernel puts typed item into UTCB, telling receiver about caps
- Kernel switches to receiver
- But: what if receive window and sent caps don't match?



Figure: Send window is smaller than receive window



Figure: Send window is larger than receive window

Delegation Code (1)

```
void Pd::xfer_items (Pd *src, Crd xlt, Crd del,
                     Xfer *s, Xfer *d, unsigned long ti)
{
  for (Crd crd; ti--; s--) {
    crd = *s;
    switch (s->flags() & 1) {
      case 0:
        xlt_crd (src, xlt, crd);
        break;
      case 1:
        del_crd (src, del, crd, s->flags(), s->hotspot());
        break;
    }
    if (d)
      *d-- = Xfer (crd, s->flags());
  }
}
```

Delegation Code (2)

```
void Pd::del_crd (Pd *pd, Crd del, Crd &crd,
                  mword sub, mword hot)
ł
  mword a = crd.attr() & del.attr();
  mword sb = crd.base(), so = crd.order();
  mword rb = del.base(), ro = del.order(), o = 0;
  switch (del.type()) {
    case Crd::MEM:
      o = clamp (sb, rb, so, ro, hot);
      delegate<Space_mem>(pd, sb, rb, o, a, sub);
      break;
    . . .
  }
  crd = Crd (del.type(), rb, o, a);
}
```

Delegation Code (3)

```
template <typename S>
void Pd::delegate (Pd *snd, mword snd_base, mword rcv_base,
                   mword ord, mword attr, mword sub)
ł
  Mdb *mdb:
  for (mword addr = snd_base;
       (mdb = snd->S::tree_lookup (addr, true));
       addr = mdb->node_base + (1UL << mdb->node_order)) {
    Mdb *node = new Mdb (static_cast<S *>(this), ...);
    if (!S::tree_insert (node))
      . . .
    if (!node->insert_node (mdb, attr))
      . . .
    S::update (node);
  }
```

- When revoking, kernel objects should be destructed
- But what if somebody accesses them at the same time?
- We could lock them during each access
- But this is expensive
- We don't care that much when exactly they are destructed
- Can't we destruct them if nobody accesses them anymore?

- Basically: copy-on-write with lazy delete
- Don't change objects, but copy them and change the copy
- Don't delete objects immediately, but when readers are done
- In case of NOVA: no copy-on-write, but only lazy delete
- On revoke, object is removed first
- Then, the object is registered for deletion
- Timer IRQ is used to delete only if all readers are gone

RCU Grace Period

