

Department of Computer Science Institute of System Architecture, Operating Systems Group

PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: THE WEB

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THE WEB AS A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM

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Problems in Practice: The Web




WEB HACKING SESSION

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


3-TIER






SCENARIO



- user accesses a sensitive service
- attacker tries to disturb
- various complex layers
- independently developed technologies are being combined
- what you see may not be what you get...



BACKEND



- goal: manipulate state stored in the backend DB
- not directly accessible (hopefully)
- improper input checking in frontend server required
- nice: inconsistency is persistent

EXAMPLE IN PHP


```
$password = $_POST['password'];
$id = $_POST['id'];
$sql = "UPDATE Accounts SET
PASSWORD = '$password' WHERE
account_id = $id";
```


Now imagine: password=';--


SQL injection



BOBBY TABLES









Comic by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com



LICENSE PLATE



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VARIATIONS

- exploit other flaws in the application logic
- insufficient boundaries between users
 - Hotmail hole exposes mails of other users
- security by obscurity
 - URL guessing can expose hidden resources
- logic bombs
 - Mikeyy worm on Twitter used code injection via custom CSS to replicate






always sanitize input



FRONTEND



- goal: manipulate content delivered to the browser
- infrastructure attacks like
 DNS cache poisoning
- solution for this:
 make sure you use SSL
- ... and check CRLs
- improper input checking can still bite you



EXAMPLE

- http://example.com/?query=query string
- generates website containing:
 You are looking for: query string
- so how about that:
 http://example.com/?query=HTML code
- remember that?
 http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/?
 search=</div>...



TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT STEPPING DOWN



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- sometimes this type of HTML injection is improperly called cross-site scripting
- injection (both HTML and SQL) can
 become cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks
- just embed <script> tags and send code
- this code will run with the privileges of the embedding site (think IE zones)
- the script can then operate the site for you



CREDENTIALS

- Can you steal site credentials with this?
- imagine a bank website allowing injection
- What do we have?
 - user needs to click attacker-provided link
 - you could display a fake login form
 - even with some JavaScript
 - the browser would indicate proper SSL
- How do you get the password?



SAME ORIGIN

- JavaScript can access password fields
- you cannot use AJAX to get the password
- same origin policy
 - JavaScript may only connect back to the originating server (with some tolerance)
- can be defeated with tags
 - encode password in URL to ping your server
- JavaScript can also read cookies...






- fix web application
 - well...
- disallow cross-site image loading?
 - lots of sites use this
- no JavaScript access to password field?
 - AJAX logins need this



REMOTE CONTROL



- goal: trick the browser to not show what's actually happening
- or: how to pull strings behind the user's back
- or: can one website control another one?
- no mischief with the server communication



SCENARIO

- user visits a regular website you control
- Can you obtain credentials of a different site?
- some preconditions
 - user is logged in to the target site in another browser tab
 - the target site identifies the user session with a cookie
- no cross-site cookie leakage in browser



CSRF

- same origin policy prevents AJAX to target
- again, is your friend
- one website can send arbitrary requests to another, unrelated site
- cross site request forgery
- a special case of the confused deputy problem
- the requests are made blindly



CAN DO

- send requests and GET parameters
 - click buttons in the UI of the target site
 - operate search fields and other text input
- basic or digest authentication? cookies?
 - browser automatically sends credential
 - session riding
- POST requests?
 - manufacture a <form> instead of



TARGETS

- study in late 2008: high-profile bank websites vulnerable
- DSL-Routers
 - disable firewall
 - reset wifi protection
 - enable UPnP
- browser-based port scanning
 - this is behind the corporate firewall





- disable cross-site POST requests
 - GET requests should by definition never change persistent state
 - there is a <u>Firefox plugin</u> for that
- never authenticate a change of persistent state by cookie only
- pass an additional credential
 - session ID in URL, edit tokens



OTHERWISE


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Log in	
Don't have an	account? Create an account.
You must have cookies enabled to log in to OSWiki.	
Username:	
Password:	
Remember my login on this computer	
Log in E-mail new password	

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BLINDNESS



- goal: mislead the user to not seeing what's actually happening
- nothing going on behind your back
- the internal state of the browser is properly displayed
- but you don't notice...



PICK ONE

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CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A (U+0430)


LATIN SMALL LETTER A (U+0061)

www.pal.com

homograph attack




CONTENT



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BETTER





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CLICKJACKING







CLICKJACKING



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- this only works when logged in
 - always log out explicitely
 - do not use persistent logins
- you may want to check wether your password manager autofills inside frames



SUMMARY

Is everything lost?

Yes