


Native Client: A sandbox for portable, untrusted x86 native code

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– Dresden, 2010-04-27

Web 2.0

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
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Not yet Web 2.0

2M TEMP.(COLORED) + SLP(CONTOURS) + SIGN. WEATHER 28.12.05 0 GMT



- Faster than interpreted code
- Make use of platform-specific assembly (e.g., SSE)
- Arbitrary code → Security threat
- **NaCl:** framework to support safe execution of x86 machine code in a sandbox

- Robert Wahbe, 1993
- Plugins in sub-address spaces (segments)
 - Segment matching: check that plugin stays within sandbox
 - Mostly static checks
 - Additionally insert runtime checks
 - Address sandboxing
 - For each memory access fix upper bits of address to segment idx
 - System calls & system resource accesses → cross-domain RPC
- Limitations
 - RISC (extended to CISC: XFI, Erlingson 2006)
 - x86 register scarcity

Native client





Figure 2: The hypothetical photo application of Figure 1 with a trusted storage service.

- Outer sandbox:
 - System-call monitoring
- Inner sandbox
 - Static checking at load-time
 - Dynamic runtime checks
- Service runtime
 - System-level interface

- Reliable disassembly
 - All valid code within text segment
 - No self-modifying code
- No unsafe instructions
 - SYSENTER, INT, segment-related instructions, RET
 - Ring 0 instructions
- Control-flow integrity
 - Ensure each jmp goes to a valid instruction

- Indirect jumps: `nacl_jump`
and `%eax, 0xFFFFFFF0`
`jmp *%eax`
- Use x86 segmentation to enforce sandbox
 - Restriction: x86/32bit
- Disallow (asynchronous) hardware exceptions
 - Would need to copy with stack segment,
which is invalidated during NaCl execution



- Unrestricted code
- System call trampolines
 - save/restore segments
 - 32-byte aligned
 - one per system call
- Springboard
 - Allow calls into NaCl modules
 - Potentially unrestricted
 - Start with HLT
- IMC sockets
 - Datagram-based
 - Higher-level protocols on top

- Modified GCC 4.2.2 + Binutils 2.18
- SPEC2000: average 5%., top 12% overhead in NaCl mode
- Near-native performance for
 - Computer graphics
 - H.264 decoding
 - Quake (yeah!)
- Going into Google Chrome

*"This is my tentative endorsement, that,
yes, Native Client could actually win*

...

*but only if they lock Tavis Ormandy in a
room for a year or two*

...

*and I'm worried about the outer sandbox, so
you should be too."*

Discussion

- Hack it?
 - Return-oriented programming works for fixed-length RISC instruction sets.
 - Doing harm depends on configuration of outer sandbox.