Countering Terrorism through Information and Privacy Protection Technologies

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Terrorism

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- highly adaptive, secretive networks
- indistinguishable from normal population
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Counterterrorism

objective	detect and identify terrorists
assumption	planning involves people, which leave traces
approach	pattern-based analysis of distributed data
problems	models, noise/amount of data, civil liberties

Information Technology

(Collection and) Analysis of Data

- modeling tools
- cooperation
- (graphical) presentation
- natural language and multimedia processing
- data mining

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- ~~data mining~~ data analysis/terrorism detection

Data Mining	vs.	Terrorism Detection
Discover models/patterns		Detect (rare) patterns
Independent instances		Networks
Sampling okay		Sampling destroys connections
Homogenous data		Heterogenous data

Example 1 – Al Qaeda's WMD Capabilities



Example 2 – Guantanamo Inmates



Example 3 – Instability of National States



Privacy

[...] our goal (and challenge) is to maximize security at an acceptable level of privacy.



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

[...] for a working definition, we would argue that personal privacy is only violated if the violated party suffers some tangible loss, such as unwarranted arrest or detention, for example.

Privacy Appliance Concept



Privacy Technologies

Data Transformation blinding

Anonymization pseudonymization

[name (first, last), telephone (area code, exchange, line number), address (street, town, state, zip code)]

$\Downarrow$

[name (first), telephone (area code), address (state), *ID*]

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Selective Revelation incremental access to data

Immutable Audit audit logs kept by *trusted 3rd party*

Self-reporting Data central authority for "truth maintenance"

Privacy Policies

Neutrality existing laws apply to new technology

Minimize Intrusiveness anonymize/pseudonymize personal data

Intermediate Not Ultimate Consequence analysts as safeguard

Audits And Oversight built-in technological safeguards

Accountability of the executive to the legislative

Necessity of redress mechanisms for false positives

People and policy oversight and penalties for abuse