

# InkTag

Secure Applications on an Untrusted Operating System

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# Motivation

- OS: untrustworthy “root of trust”
- Verification is easier than implementation
- ... even more so with paraverification


## Goals

- Protect applications from untrusted OS
- Secure use of (a subset of) OS services
- Sharing of data among mutually trusting applications
- Fine-grained and flexible access control

# Design

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# Building Blocks

## Object

- File or memory region
- Comprised of  $\mathbb{S}$ -pages
- 64-bit object identifier (*OID*)

## $\mathbb{S}$ -page


- Data (4 kB on x86)
- Metadata:  $\langle \text{OID}, \text{offset} \rangle$ , hash, crypto IV

## Nested Paging


- PT: guest-virtual  $\rightarrow$  guest-physical (OS)
- EPT: guest-physical  $\rightarrow$  host-physical (Hypervisor)
- Independent EPTs for un-/trusted execution

# Secure Memory Management


## Hypervisor EPT mapping



## Trusted execution



## Untrusted execution




■ Secure physical frame    ■ Untrusted physical frame

# Paraverification

## HAP


- Maintains array:  $\langle \text{address range, OLD, offset} \rangle$
- Hands *token* to OS with each mapping request



# Paraverification

## HAP

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- Hands *token* to OS with each mapping request



## Hypervisor

- OS provides page table update + token
- Look up OID associated with virtual address using token
- Check access permissions and integrity of frame



# Access Control

## Attribute

- Hierarchically composed string (`.user.alice`)
- Attached to HAPs, kept across fork and exec
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- $\text{OID} = \text{hash}(\text{namespace} + \text{file name})$
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
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## HAP startup

- Hypercall: OID of binary + memory layout
- Hypervisor sets up HAP context and adds (`.bin.<oid>`)

# Storage

- Metadata interleaved with  $\mathbb{S}$ -pages
- OS presented with virtual disk lacking metadata blocks
- Keep two hashes for  $\mathbb{S}$ -pages during update





# Prototype


- Linux 2.6.36 + extension to KVM
- QEMU block driver for virtual disk
- libinktag ( 2000 SLOC) wrapped by libC

	Linux	InkTag	Overhead
null	0.04	2.23	55.80×
open/close	0.87	6.90	7.95×
ctxsw 2p/0k	0.71	1.01	1.41×
File create	5.46	12.92	2.36×
File delete	3.40	7.56	2.23×
mmap	4059.20	40360.00	9.94×
pagefault	0.89	6.68	7.50×
fork	99.00	567.80	5.74×
fork+exec	290.60	882.60	3.04×

# Storage



## SPEC 2006 (C only)





# Benchmark II

## Large Applications

	Linux	InkTag
Apache latency	195 ms	220 ms (1.13 $\times$ )
Apache throughput	462.42 req/s	453.93 req/s (1.02 $\times$ )
Dokuwiki throughput	13.6 req/s	8.83 req/s (1.54 $\times$ )

	Apache		DokuWiki	
	Linux	InkTag	Linux	InkTag
Check hash	-	209	-	2,911,649
Check zero hash	-	57	-	2,893,517
Update hash	-	82	-	1,029
EPT fault	689	1,131	10,668	78,055
VM-exit	171,145	1,217,042	138,801	11,216,363